Quantitative analysis of the leakage of confidential data
Hunt, S., Clark, D. & Malacaria, P. (2002). Quantitative analysis of the leakage of confidential data. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 59(3), pp. 1-14. doi: 10.1016/S1571-0661(04)00290-7
Abstract
Basic information theory is used to analyse the amount of confidential information which may be leaked by programs written in a very simple imperative language. In particular, a detailed analysis is given of the possible leakage due to equality tests and if statements. The analysis is presented as a set of syntax-directed inference rules and can readily be automated.
Publication Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (Satellite Event for PLI 2001) |
Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science |
Departments: | School of Science & Technology > Computer Science > Software Reliability School of Science & Technology > Computer Science |
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