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Abstract

A stream of recent judgments by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice has shed light on the procedures that govern treaty-making by the European Union. This article explores how this case-law aproaches the principle of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation between the institutions. It argues that the former is construed in a balanced manner on the basis of a literal interpretation of primary law that promotes strict compliance with procedural rules and does not favour a particular institution. As for the duty of cooperation, whilste its procedural dimension is strengthened, its scope remains somewhat elusive. The analysis identifies a pragmatic streak in the Court’s balanced approach, and argues that there is an inherent limit to the impact of constitutional law on inter-institutional disputes. Ultimately, the less time and energy the institutions waste on turf wars about their procedural powers, the greater their contribution to inceasing the efficiency of the Union’s treaty-making practice.

Publication Type:	Article
Publisher Keywords:	Article 218 TFEU, ECJ, European Law, procedures, treaty-making
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) K Law
Departments:	The City Law School > Academic Programmes The City Law School > Institute for the Study of European Laws

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