City Research Online

Speculation under unawareness

Galanis, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-4286-7449 (2018). Speculation under unawareness. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, pp. 598-615. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.001


“No trade” theorems establish that, in various trading environments, investors who share a common prior will not engage in speculation, as long as expected utility, Bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed. We relax the last assumption by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions speculative behaviour emerges. We find that if common knowledge is assumed (as in the settings of Aumann, 1976 and Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), unawareness cannot generate speculation. This is not true, however, in settings where no common knowledge is assumed, such as speculation in equilibrium (Geanakoplos, 1989) and betting that is always beneficial (Morris, 1994), unless stronger conditions on awareness are imposed.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © Elsevier 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
Publisher Keywords: Unawareness, Trade, Speculation, Knowledge, Common knowledge, Bounded perception, Awareness
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
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Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

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