City Research Online

Abstract

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation, and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated-game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Che, X., Katayama, H, Lee, P and Shi, N (2019). Warranty, seller reputation, and buyer experience: evidence from ebay used car auctions. The Journal of Industrial Economics, which has been published in final form at doi.org/10.1111/joie.12213. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

Export

Downloads