Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants
Schlegel, J. C. ORCID: 0000-0002-8385-8349, Klaus, B. & Karakaya, M. (2019). Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 184, article number 104948. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948
Abstract
We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tenants a top trading cycles (TTC) rule is consistent if and only if its underlying priority structure satisfies our acyclicity condition. Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two specific rules, YRMH-IGYT (you request my house - I get your turn) and efficient priority rules, that are applied in two steps. Moreover, even if no priority structure is a priori given, we show that a rule is a top trading cycles rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities if and only if it satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and either reallocation-proofness or non-bossiness.
Publication Type: | Article |
---|---|
Additional Information: | © 2019 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
Publisher Keywords: | Consistency, House allocation, Matching, Strategy-proofness, Top trading cycles |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
Download (681kB) | Preview
Export
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year