A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive
Celik, L. 
ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2014).
A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive.
Review of Industrial Organization, 44(2),
pp. 161-178.
doi: 10.1007/s11151-013-9409-5
Abstract
I analyze if the excessive quality disclosure finding of the “classical literature” extends to environments in which consumers have a downward-sloping demand. While the answer is affirmative, there are at least two situations under which disclosure is socially insufficient: (1) when there are quality levels that are too low to generate any positive demand; and (2) when the prior beliefs place sufficiently higher weight on lower qualities. In both cases, non-disclosure by the seller leads to a severe reduction in the perceived quality, thereby significantly lowering the demand and the quantity consumed.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Industrial Organization. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9409-5. |
| Publisher Keywords: | Monopoly, Quality uncertainty, Verifiable information disclosure |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HF Commerce |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Metadata
MetadataActions (login required)
Admin Login