City Research Online

Abstract

We study how institutional blockholdings affect firm voluntary disclosure. We document that concentrated institutional ownership reduces firms’ voluntary disclosure measured by the propensity to issue management forecasts, comprehensiveness of guidance, propensity to engage in conference calls, and the number of 8-K filings. We identify two channels through which blockholders affect firms’ voluntary disclosure. First, blockholders have easier access to managers and substitute private for public information acquisition. Second, a higher proportion of non-monitoring blockholders with low demand for voluntary disclosure, such as passive blockholders, reduces the firm’s incentive to provide voluntary disclosure. The results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. Our study identifies an important effect that concentrated ownership has on firm corporate disclosure.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative ommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Publisher Keywords:	passive ownership, institutional investors, blockholder, voluntary disclosure
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Departments:	Bayes Business School > Finance
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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