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Score Disclosure

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Drugov, L. (2021). Score Disclosure (DP16707). London, UK: CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research.


We study verifiable disclosure by a monopolist when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which the firm discloses a score---the average of the qualities---without revealing any further information. While full unraveling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by the score equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits. Moreover, it is ``defeated'' by the score equilibrium.

Publication Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: CEPR © Copyright 2021
Publisher Keywords: Monopoly; Multidimensional types; Quality uncertainty; Verifiable information disclosure
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
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