Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Cerrone, C. 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723, Hermstrüwer, Y. & Robalo, P. (2021).
Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior, 129,
pp. 114-143.
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011
Abstract
This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments – the exclusion of colluding bidders – on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Publisher Keywords: | Debarment, Collusion, Procurement auctions, Sanctions |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
Download (548kB) | Preview
Export
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
Metadata
MetadataActions (login required)
Admin Login