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Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions

Cerrone, C. ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723, Hermstrüwer, Y. & Robalo, P. (2021). Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 129, pp. 114-143. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011


This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments – the exclusion of colluding bidders – on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
Publisher Keywords: Debarment, Collusion, Procurement auctions, Sanctions
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs
School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
SWORD Depositor:
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