Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness
Cerrone, C. ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723 & Engel, C. (2019). Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness. Economics Letters, 183, article number 108616. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616
Abstract
We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for ”moral wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate selfishness.
Publication Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | © 2024. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
Publisher Keywords: | Dictator game, Decision making on behalf of others, Order effect |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HM Sociology |
Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
SWORD Depositor: |
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616
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