City Research Online

Abstract

In relation to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret mixed agreements, it has been argued that:

‘[whilst] the case-law [is] copious, … successive developments, far from offering a smooth passage, have constructed a long and winding path, whose complex route demands certain adjustments in order to help its confused users find their way’.

This argument was made by Advocate General Colomer in his Opinion in Case C- 431/05 Merck. In the same Opinion, he refers to the ‘deficiencies’ of the relevant case-law as well as the latter’s ‘illogical’ consequences.

This Chapter will examine whether this statement is borne out by the case-law of the Court of Justice. The analysis is structured in thee parts. First, it will examine the origin of the Court’s approach to its jurisdiction. Second, it will set out the parameters of the wide construction of its jurisdiction in the contest of the preliminary reference procedure. Third, it will outline its approach as developed in the context of enforcement proceedings. Finally, it will analyse the above developments in the light of the more recent judgment in Case C-431/05 Merck. Throughout this analysis, the threads which bring together the different strands of the Court’s case-law and the quest for identifying the Community interest, as well as the methods which would serve it best, will be examined.

Publication Type:	Book Section
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General)
Departments:	The City Law School > Academic Programmes The City Law School > Institute for the Study of European Laws

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