City Research Online

Abstract

We introduce a game theoretical model of stealing interactions. We model the situation as an extensive form game when one individual may attempt to steal a valuable item from another who may in turn defend it. The population is not homogeneous, but rather each individual has a different Resource Holding Potential (RHP). We assume that RHP not only influences the outcome of the potential aggressive contest (the individual with the larger RHP is more likely to win), but that it also influences how an individual values a particular resource. We investigate several valuation scenarios and study the prevalence of aggressive behaviour. We conclude that the relationship between RHP and resource value is crucial, where some cases lead to fights predominantly between pairs of strong individuals, and some between pairs of weak individuals. Other cases lead to no fights with one individual conceding, and the order of strategy selection is crucial, where the individual which picks its strategy first often has an advantage.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	copyright EDP Science 2014.
Publisher Keywords:	stealing, resource holding potential, game theory, Producer-Scrounger game
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Departments:	School of Science & Technology > Mathematics
Related URLs:	Author
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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