City Research Online

Article

Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 & Young, K. (2022). Lobbying to the Rhythm of Wall Street? Explaining the Political Advocacy of Non-Financial Corporations over Financial Regulatory Policy. Socio-Economic Review, 20(2), pp. 659-685. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwab048

Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 & Wilf, M. (2021). Regulatory Novelty after Financial Crises: A Quantitative Text Analysis of International Banking and Securities Standards, 1975-2016. Regulation and Governance, 15(3), pp. 933-951. doi: 10.1111/rego.12346

Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 & Young, K. (2020). Exploring Information Exchange among Interest Groups: A Text-Reuse Approach. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(11), pp. 1698-1717. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1817132

Kovras, I. ORCID: 0000-0003-2787-2389 & Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 (2020). Crisis and Punishment? Explaining Politicians’ Appetite for Retribution in Post-Crisis Europe. Comparative Politics, 53(4), pp. 595-615. doi: 10.5129/001041521x16026878142074

James, S., Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 & Young, K. (2020). The Internationalization of European Financial Networks: A Quantitative Text Analysis of EU Consultation Responses. Review of International Political Economy, 28(4), pp. 898-925. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2020.1779781

Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296, Phillips, L. & Young, K. (2020). The Financialization of Policy Preferences: Financial Asset Ownership, Regulation and Crisis Management. Socio-Economic Review, 18(3), pp. 655-680. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwy027

Monnet, É., Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 & Vallée, S. (2019). Beyond financial repression and regulatory capture. The recomposition of European financial ecosystems after the crisis. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, N° 229(4), pp. 14-33. doi: 10.3917/arss.229.0014

Pagliari, S. & Young, K. (2016). The Interest Ecology of Financial Regulation: Interest Group Plurality in the Design of Financial Regulatory Policies. Socio-Economic Review, 14(2), pp. 309-337. doi: 10.1093/ser/mwv024

Pagliari, S. & Young, K. (2015). Capital United? Business Unity in Regulatory Politics and the Special Place of Finance. Regulation and Governance, 11(1), pp. 3-23. doi: 10.1111/rego.12098

Pagliari, S. (2014). Fixing International Finance: Between International Rule-Making and Domestic Cosmetic Compliance. International Studies Review, 16(4), pp. 673-675. doi: 10.1111/misr.12173

Pagliari, S. & Young, K. (2014). Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions. Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), pp. 575-610. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2013.819811

Pagliari, S. (2014). The governance and regulation of international finance. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 32(2), pp. 1-2. doi: 10.1068/c3202rvw

Pagliari, S. (2012). A wall around Europe? The European regulatory response to the global financial crisis and the turn in transatlantic relations. Journal of European Integration, 35(4), pp. 391-408. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2012.689830

Pagliari, S. (2012). Who governs finance? The shifting public-private divide in the regulation of derivatives, rating agencies and hedge funds. European Law Journal, 18(1), pp. 44-61. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00585.x

Helleiner, E. & Pagliari, S. (2011). The end of an era in international financial regulation? A post-crisis research agenda. International Organization, 65(1), pp. 169-200. doi: 10.1017/s0020818310000305

Book Section

Pagliari, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-0612-5296 & Young, K. (2020). How Financialization is Reproduced Politically. In: Mader, P., Mertens, D. & van der Zwan, N. (Eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Financialization. Routledge International Handbooks. . London: Routledge.

Pagliari, S. (2018). The Second Half: Interest Group Conflicts and Coalitions in the Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act Derivatives Rules. In: Helleiner, E., Pagliari, S. & Spagna, I. (Eds.), Governing the World's Biggest Market: The Politics of Derivatives Regulation After the 2008 Crisis. (pp. 137-167). New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

Pagliari, S. (2013). Governing Financial Stability: the Financial Stability Board as the Emerging Pillar in Global Economic Governance. In: Moschella, M (Ed.), Handbook of Global Economic Governance. . Routledge.

Pagliari, S. & Young, K. (2012). Who Mobilizes? An Analysis of Stakeholder Responses to Financial Policy Consultations. In: Pagliari, S. (Ed.), Making Good Financial Regulation - Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture. (pp. 85-98). International Centre for Financial Regulation.

Pagliari, S. (2012). How Can We Mitigate Capture in Financial Regulation? In: Pagliari, S. (Ed.), Making Good Financial Regulation: Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture. (pp. 1-50). International Centre for Financial Regulation.

Pagliari, S. & Helleiner, E. (2009). Crisis and the Reform of International Financial Regulation. In: Helleiner, E, Pagliari, S & Zimmerman, H (Eds.), Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Financial Regulation. . Taylor & Francis.

Helleiner, E. & Pagliari, S. (2009). The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global Financial Governance. In: Helleiner, E, Pagliari, S & Zimmerman, H (Eds.), Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change. . Taylor & Francis.