A Stylized model of European Monetary Union for Analysing coordination games for Monetary and Macroprudential Policy

Pearlman, J. (2015). A Stylized model of European Monetary Union for Analysing coordination games for Monetary and Macroprudential Policy. MACFINROBODS.

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Abstract

Following on from Quint and Rabanal (2014), who find that coordination between the monetary authority and macroprudential regulators generates virtually identical results to non-coordination, we extend their model in a variety of ways. We address the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates, feedback of the macroprudential tool on the output growth rate, and the role of reserves. In all cases, we find that there is significant impact on the coefficients of the simple rule and on consumption-equivalent welfare effects.

Item Type: Monograph (Other)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/16761

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