City Research Online

Abstract

Existing literature has offered a variety of claims regarding why financial regulatory politics features a relative dominance of the regulated financial industry. In this article we explore the broader interest group environment in which financial industry advocacy operates. Using new data on interest group participation in financial regulatory consultations, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the ecology of interest groups that populate financial regulatory policymaking. Through a new measure of ‘mobilized dissent’ we find evidence that the level of interest group pluralism in financial regulatory policymaking is constrained by the limited mobilization of voices outside of the business community. We analyze how mobilized dissent toward the regulated financial industry changes in response to different institutional environments. While technical complexity, institutional context, and the global financial crisis are found to impact the level of mobilized dissent, the impact of these environmental conditions varies across different groups. This analysis reveals not only that organized opposition to the financial industry is relatively weak but also that it is relatively disjointed.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Socio-Economic Review following peer review. The version of record is available available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwv024
Publisher Keywords:	financial regulation, interest groups, lobbying, political economy
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs > International Politics
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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