City Research Online

Optimal sequential auctions

Jofre-Bonet, M. & Pesendorfer, M. (2014). Optimal sequential auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33(1), pp. 61-71. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.02.002

Abstract

Sequential sealed first-price and open descending-price procurement-auctions are studied. We examine which procurement-auction rule achieves the low procurement cost. We show that the answer to this policy question depends on whether the items are complements or substitutes. With substitutes, the first-price procurement-auction is preferred, while with complements, the open descending-price procurement-auction is preferred. We also illustrate the procurement cost minimizing auction and the auction rule preferred by the bidders. With substitutes, bidders prefer the open descending-price procurement-auction, while with complements bidders prefer the first-price procurement-auction.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2014, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: Complementarities; Optimal auctions; Sequential auctions; Substitutes
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
SWORD Depositor:
[thumbnail of Optimal Sequential Auctions - feb 2014.pdf]
Preview
Text - Accepted Version
Available under License : See the attached licence file.

Download (285kB) | Preview
[thumbnail of Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence]
Preview
Text (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence) - Other
Download (201kB) | Preview

Export

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

Actions (login required)

Admin Login Admin Login