A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
Schlegel, J. C. 
ORCID: 0000-0002-8385-8349 (2018).
A note on ex-ante stable lotteries.
Economics Letters, 164,
pp. 90-93.
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.017
Abstract
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent–object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability, one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Publisher Keywords: | Matching, School choice, Lotteries, Ex-ante stability |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
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