The Performance of Acquisitions by High Default Risk Bidders
Bruyland, E., Lasfer, M. 
ORCID: 0000-0003-2338-672X, De Maeseneire, W. & Song, W. (2019).
The Performance of Acquisitions by High Default Risk Bidders.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 101,
pp. 37-58.
doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.01.019
Abstract
We investigate the takeover strategies of high default risk acquirers and their value impact. We find that these bidders select bigger, less profitable and unrelated targets, pursue transactions during recessions, and pay with shares by offering target shareholders high premiums. Their long-term buy-and-hold returns are extremely negative, and reflect fundamentally their substantial drop in profitability combined with high leverage. We show that the well-established long-run underperformance of acquiring firms is largely driven by this sub-set of acquirers. The results are similar when we use alternative measures of default risk and performance, and a global sample of non-US bidders.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © Elsevier 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Publisher Keywords: | Mergers and acquisitions; High default risk bidders; Long-term performance; Short-term market reaction; Agency conflicts; Distress |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD61 Risk Management H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Departments: | Bayes Business School > Finance |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
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