Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
Schlegel, J. C. 
ORCID: 0000-0002-8385-8349 (2020).
Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms.
Games and Economic Behavior, 123,
pp. 41-53.
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.005
Abstract
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Publisher Keywords: | Matching with contracts, College admission, Substitutes, Observable substitutes, Strategy-proofness, Deferred acceptance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
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