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Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms

Schlegel, J. C. ORCID: 0000-0002-8385-8349 (2020). Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.005

Abstract

We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: Matching with contracts, College admission, Substitutes, Observable substitutes, Strategy-proofness, Deferred acceptance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Departments: School of Arts & Social Sciences > Economics
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2020 12:15
URI: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24464
[img] Text - Accepted Version
This document is not freely accessible until 1 July 2021 due to copyright restrictions.
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

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