The Dark Side of Transparency: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works
Mayskaya, T. & Nikandrova, A. 
ORCID: 0000-0003-0131-4303 (2023).
The Dark Side of Transparency: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works.
Journal of Economic Theory, 212,
article number 105699.
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105699
Abstract
A hider publicly commits to the number of seekers and then privately gets involved in a story, which may be compromising. Each seeker aims to be the first to learn and report a compromising story. The seekers learn the story privately and in continuous time. With more seekers, the hider's story gets revealed at a faster rate, but each seeker gets discouraged and ceases learning more quickly. To reduce the probability of a compromising report, the hider may optimally choose infinitely many seekers. Nevertheless, the hider unambiguously benefits from making it harder for each seeker to learn her story.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Publisher Keywords: | Transparency, Poisson process, Strategic experimentation, Private learning, Privacy paradox |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Department of Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.
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