Delegation of learning from multiple sources of information
Diamantopoulos, A. & Nikandrova, A. 
ORCID: 0000-0003-0131-4303 (2025).
Delegation of learning from multiple sources of information.
European Economic Review, 173,
article number 104981.
doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104981
Abstract
A principal delegates a decision to a biased expert. Before taking the decision, the expert may undertake incremental learning about the unknown binary state from two alternative information sources. There are no transfers but the principal retains the right to terminate the expert’s learning to take the decision herself. The right to terminate learning benefits the principal when the preferences of the principal and the expert are sufficiently misaligned but may be detrimental when the preferences are sufficiently closely aligned.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This article is available under the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC license and permits non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Publisher Keywords: | Delegation of learning, Poisson process, Learning in continuous time |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
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