City Research Online

Abstract

When members of the same household have different risk preferences, whose preference matters more for investment decisions and why? We propose an intrahousehold model that aggregates individual preferences at the household level as a result of bargaining. We structurally estimate the model, analyze the determinants of bargaining power, and find a significant gender gap. Gender differences in individual characteristics, as well as gender effects, partially explain the gap. These patterns hold broadly across Australia, Germany, and the United States. We further link the distribution of bargaining power to households’ perceived gender norms in a cross-sectional analysis.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC BY license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs School of Policy & Global Affairs > Department of Economics
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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