City Research Online

Abstract

The Aumann–Shapley [Values of Non-atomic Games, Princeton University Press, Princeton] value, originating in cooperative game theory, is used for the allocation of risk capital to portfolios of pooled liabilities, as proposed by Denault [Coherent allocation of risk capital, J. Risk 4 (1) (2001) 1]. We obtain an explicit formula for the Aumann–Shapley value, when the risk measure is given by a distortion premium principle [Axiomatic characterisation of insurance prices, Insur. Math. Econ. 21 (2) (1997) 173]. The capital allocated to each instrument or (sub)portfolio is given as its expected value under a change of probability measure. Motivated by Mirman and Tauman [Demand compatible equitable cost sharing prices, Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1) (1982) 40], we discuss the role of Aumann–Shapley prices in an equilibrium context and present a simple numerical example.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in <Journal title>. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Volume 33, Issue 2, 20 October 2003, Pages 239–254, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6687(03)00137-9.
Publisher Keywords:	Cooperative games; Aumann–Shapley value; Distortion premium principle; Coherent risk measures; Equilibrium
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Departments:	Bayes Business School > Actuarial Science & Insurance
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

Export

Downloads