Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities

Schlegel, J. C. (2017). Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities (Report No. 17/05). London, UK: Department of Economics, City, University of London.

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Abstract

Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries, we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities. We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for random assignments. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: Copyright 2017, the authors.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market
Divisions: School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18702

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