Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees
Cerrone, C. 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723 & Manna, E. (2018).
Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 18(1),
article number 20170190.
doi: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
Abstract
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Publisher Keywords: | adverse selection, intrinsic motivation, individual and team incentives, |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
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