City Research Online

Abstract

Drawing on transaction costs analysis, this study investigates the effect of two partner-selection strategies in government R&D programs: selection based on dyadic relation and network reputation of candidate partners. While governments play a vital role in mitigating opportunistic behavior, direct intervention of governments can increase administrative burdens and decrease efficiency, leading to higher costs for the government. Building upon existing literature on relational and network theories, the research aims to provide insights on the role of partner-selection strategies as effective self-enforcing mechanisms on opportunism control. A simulation model is proposed to track long-term changes in network configuration and transaction costs under project uncertainties. The base model demonstrated that selection based on relations forms a more cost-effective partner network. The next step is to analyze how the transaction costs of these two strategies change on the project uncertainty.

Publication Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:	Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Publisher Keywords:	Partner-selection strategy, reputation, relation, opportunism, government R&D program
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform J Political Science Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Departments:	Bayes Business School Bayes Business School > Management
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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