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Sequential sealed first-price and open descending-price procurement-auctions are studied. We examine which procurement-auction rule achieves the low procurement cost. We show that the answer to this policy question depends on whether the items are complements or substitutes. With substitutes, the first-price procurement-auction is preferred, while with complements, the open descending-price procurement-auction is preferred. We also illustrate the procurement cost minimizing auction and the auction rule preferred by the bidders. With substitutes, bidders prefer the open descending-price procurement-auction, while with complements bidders prefer the first-price procurement-auction.
|Additional Information:||© 2014, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Complementarities; Optimal auctions; Sequential auctions; Substitutes|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics|
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