Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
Schlegel, J. C. 
ORCID: 0000-0002-8385-8349 & Mamageishvili, A. (2020).
Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities.
Games and Economic Behavior, 124,
pp. 62-81.
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009
Abstract
We introduce new notions of priority-constrained efficiency and provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a priority-constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Publisher Keywords: | Matching, Random assignments, Priority-based allocation, Constrained efficiency, Pseudo-Market |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory L Education > LB Theory and practice of education |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
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