City Research Online

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Drugov, L. (2021). Score Disclosure (DP16707). London, UK: CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research.

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Akoz, K. K. & Arbatli, C. E. (2020). Manipulation through Biased Product Reviews. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 68(4), pp. 591-639. doi: 10.1111/joie.12240

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2020). Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation. Journal of International Economics, 127, article number 103392. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103392

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Anderson, S. (2020). Opaque Selling (10.2139/ssrn.3521450). .

Anderson, S. P. & Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2020). Opaque selling. Information Economics and Policy, 52, article number 100869. doi: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100869

Celik, L., Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2019). Fast-Track Authority: A Hold-Up Interpretation (10.2139/ssrn.3139181). .

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Karabay, B. (2016). Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model. Theory and Decision, 81(1), pp. 33-52. doi: 10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2016). Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44, pp. 113-122. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2015). When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), pp. 347-389. doi: 10.1257/mic.20140031

Anderson, S. P. & Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2015). Product line design. Journal of Economic Theory, 157, pp. 517-526. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.014

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2014). Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes. Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(1), pp. 113-136. doi: 10.1111/joie.12043

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2014). A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive. Review of Industrial Organization, 44(2), pp. 161-178. doi: 10.1007/s11151-013-9409-5

Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2013). Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining. Journal of International Economics, 91(2), pp. 179-190. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001