Items where Author is "Celik, L."
Article
Celik, L. 
ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Akoz, K. K. & Arbatli, C. E. (2020).
Manipulation through Biased Product Reviews.
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 68(4),
pp. 591-639.
doi: 10.1111/joie.12240
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2020).
Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation.
Journal of International Economics, 127,
article number 103392.
doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103392
Anderson, S. P. & Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2020).
Opaque selling.
Information Economics and Policy, 52,
article number 100869.
doi: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100869
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Karabay, B. (2016).
Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model.
Theory and Decision, 81(1),
pp. 33-52.
doi: 10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2016).
Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44,
pp. 113-122.
doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2015).
When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3),
pp. 347-389.
doi: 10.1257/mic.20140031
Anderson, S. P. & Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2015).
Product line design.
Journal of Economic Theory, 157,
pp. 517-526.
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.014
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2014).
Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(1),
pp. 113-136.
doi: 10.1111/joie.12043
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2014).
A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive.
Review of Industrial Organization, 44(2),
pp. 161-178.
doi: 10.1007/s11151-013-9409-5
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2013).
Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining.
Journal of International Economics, 91(2),
pp. 179-190.
doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001
Working Paper
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Drugov, L. (2021).
Score Disclosure (DP16707).
London, UK: CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 & Anderson, S. (2020).
Opaque Selling (10.2139/ssrn.3521450).
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Celik, L., Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2019). Fast-Track Authority: A Hold-Up Interpretation (10.2139/ssrn.3139181). .